Monday, July 02, 2007

Terror, terror, terror

Terror dominates the news today, a fact which should please Bush's remaining supporters -- although I'm not sure he'll receive much of an approval-rating bounce from these events.

In the U.K.: Whatever else might be said of the car bomb attacks in Britain, they appear to be work of incompetents -- or perhaps (if you are of a cynical turn of mind) of competent folk who wanted to create the appearance of terror while doing the least possible damage.

Five men have been arrested so far, including an Iraqi doctor working at the Royal Alexandra Hospital. (I bet that the right-wing bloggers will go nutso over that factoid.) Initial reports -- which are still quite sketchy, of course -- indicate that the police were able to track down suspects using car rental information. If those reports turn out to be true, one can only stand amazed at "terrorists" capable of such poor planning.

Yemen. Seven people, including six tourists from Spain, were killed in a blast at an ancient temple in Yemen. This ghastly incident, unlike the U.K. performance, has a more-or-less convincing "feel" of Al Qaeda at work.

Summer fun. Brian Ross of ABC has filed a strange report of a terror "spectacular" planned for this summer. Could this event be the long-predicted, long-dreaded suitcase nuke attack?

What makes the Ross report particularly odd is the provenance of the information: "Law enforcement" -- not CIA, not Homeland Security. We have no indication as to which cops might be involved.

Is it possible that Ross' definition of "law enforcement" is loose enough to include the FBI?

Few commentators have noted that the latest ABC report links up with the recent outrages in the U.K.:
As ABCNews.com reported, U.S. law enforcement officials received intelligence reports two weeks ago warning of terror attacks in Glasgow and Prague, the Czech Republic, against "airport infrastructure and aircraft."

The warnings apparently never reached officials in Scotland, who said this weekend they had received "no advance intelligence" that Glasgow might be a target.

Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff declined to comment specifically on on the report today, but said "everything that we get is shared virtually instantaneously with our counterparts in Britain and vice versa."
Can you make sense of this? Unspecified cops somewhere in the U.S. received advance info about the Glasgow car bombing, which, as it turns out, was an amateurish botch. The cops did not transmit the data to Scotland. Homeland Security, whose business this is, claims that it had received no such warning. How could a local flatfoot receive data that escaped the notice of the agency created to scope out such events? Why wouldn't any cop in receipt of such data place an immediate call to Homeland Security?

Conventional cynicism (if I may coin such a phrase) holds that only a staged terror attack could rescue Bush's presidency. But the man may now have achieved such depths of unpopularity that even a massive loss of life would evince a "blame the scapegoat" reaction instead of a "protect us, Daddy!" reaction.

Bio-Terror. The Los Angeles Times (echoed by this blogger) exposes Ken Alibek, a former Soviet doctor and Army colonel who came to this country and set himself up as an expert in biological terror. He quickly gained the ear of the administration, DARPA, the CIA, and the national media. Alibek confidently asserted that Saddam Hussein possessed biological WMDs.

But it turns out that the Russian may be just a wee bit unreliable:
No biological weapon of mass destruction has been found in Iraq. His most sensational research findings, with U.S. colleagues, have not withstood peer review by scientific specialists. His promotion of nonprescription pills — sold in his name over the Internet and claiming to bolster the immune system — was ridiculed by some scientists. He resigned as executive director of a Virginia university's biodefense center 10 months ago while facing internal strife over his stewardship.

And, as Alibek raised fear of bioterrorism in the United States, he also has sought to profit from that fear.

By his count, Alibek has won about $28 million in federal grants or contracts for himself or entities that hired him.
That's not all, folks: Turns out Alibek pushed a rather strange theory that smallpox vaccinations could cure AIDS. That claim belongs in the Journal of Irreproducible Results.

5 comments:

Anonymous said...

I don't know if it's the suitcase nuke attack, Joe, but I'll confess to not having a good feeling, in as much as anyone should ever rely on her feelings alone to draw conclusions about anything.

Part of me wants to write that there's no way the Bush folks left in "government" would pull something like this now, because of the likelihood it would manage to backfire, which you mention. Except I fear that these new reports about U.S. terror aren't being promoted by Bush's crew, but are instead coming from Cheney--who still appears to me to be beyond the reach of the Bush family's influence.

Would Cheney be crazy (and desperate) enough to try to "set it off" at this late date, either to avoid getting yanked out of office or to give him enough leverage to attempt one last lunge at Iran? I actually think he would, but that he may still face intense opposition from the Bush crowd and the agency. Which is why I can't decide if a "don't waste bandwidth promoting propaganda" or a "blog the hell out of this" response is more advisable.

Anonymous said...

The LA Times expose of Alibek focused on his use of bioterror for personal enrichment but didn't mention any of the issues I find most striking:

1) What was the connection between Alibek and his former fellow-employee at Batelle, Jerome Hauer, advising the White House immediately after 9/11 -- for no obvious reason -- to take Cipro as an anthrax preventive? For that matter, what is the connection between Alibek and the anthrax hysteria in general?

2) The Times article suggests that Alibek was behind the idea that Iraq, Iran, and North Korea had all received bioweapons from Russia. So what is the connection between Alibek and the unlikely linking of those same three nations as an "axis of terror" in Bush's 2002 SOTU?

3) What is the significance of Alibek's having been a guest speaker at the Intelligence Summit, that haunt of every Iran warhawk and general WMD fruitcake in town? The fact that Alibek's partner Vaughn Forrest's former associate Yossef Bodansky is fairly deeply involved with the Intelligence Summit suggests that Alibek's presence there was more than casual.

The bioterrorism field is full of casual opportunists, but a few names suggest a deeper level of knowledge and initiative -- and Alibek's is one of them. I would say the LA Times did him a disservice by not giving him full credit.

DrewL said...

To call the UK bozos "terrorists" is an affront to every professional terrorist out there. They were like kindergartners trying to play ball with the New England Patriots. What a joke!

If nothing else, it gave the powers-that-be every opportunity to play the fear card as much as possible. Let's see...we had the Fort Dix conspiracy about two months ago...then the JFK plot about a month ago...and now this. Convenient. Just like last summer. Anything to keep fear and terror center stage.

Anonymous said...

At the end of April 2007, George Mason University made another decision that was felt by the biodefense students to severely impact the quality of their educational program. In response, a former university student who previously had access to and had retained copies of important documents decided to release some of those documents to the students. Since they are interesting, I am sending them to you so that the world can see more of this fascinating story.

Regards,
Ann Workman

Letter from Ken Alibek resigning as Program Director

George Mason University
National Center for Biodefense
10900 University Blvd. MSN 4E3
Manassas, VA 20110
Tel. (703) 993-8545
Fax (703) 993-4288
June 17, 2005
Dr. Daniele Struppa
Dean - College of Arts and Sciences
George Mason University
4400 University Drive
MSN 3A3
Fairfax, VA 22030

Dear Dr. Struppa,
Just over a month ago, you, Dr. Chandhoke, Dr. Bailey and I met to discuss the future of the Graduate Programs in Biodefense. The result of that meeting was that significant changes were to be made to the program beginning in the Fall 2005 semester. At the time a follow-up meeting was scheduled for a week later (then canceled) so that as a group we could finalize the changes that needed to be made. For weeks I have anxiously awaited the follow up to that meeting but I have heard nothing (I have not even received the courtesy of a response to my emails outlining my suggestions). I can only interpret this lack of attention as a lack of interest in the improvement of the program. The fall semester is two months away and there has been no word on exactly what the changes are and how they are to be implemented.

When the Graduate Programs in Biodefense were created they were based on what I believed to be a shared vision of what biodefense meant. For reasons still unclear to me, the College has decided to turn the program into something fundamentally different than what was originally intended and planned.

Over the past month I have tried to reconcile myself to these changes. As time passes, however, I am increasingly uncomfortable with the direction the program is taking and I am not comfortable directing the program. I can not jeopardize my credibility in order to appease those who have no understanding of what biothreat and biodefense are.
I have several specific concerns, the first of which is that the majority of our students already work in the fields of national and homeland security and/or chem/biodefense. These are experienced professionals who will neither be well served by, nor satisfied with a program that offers only a superficial survey of the field. In fact, these professionals already know much in the area of biodefense and came to this program to make their knowledge more sophisticated.

The issue of having a large number of appropriately trained experts in biodefense is more pressing than ever. The asymmetrical threat of bioterrorism is increasingly recognized by the U.S. government. The fact that 5-7 grams of anthrax powder sent through the mail in 2001 resulted in over $1 billion in decontamination costs alone clearly demonstrates how important this issue is.

My second concern is that dissolving the four concentrations completely does a great disservice to our current and future students. A microbiologist interested in medical biodefense has little interest in nonproliferation issues and vice versa. We’ve already witnessed such frustration when students take the core courses. The students with a life sciences background want more sophisticated scientific knowledge in the field of medical and engineering defense; while students with a policy background are more interested in biological warfare, bioterrorism threat, biodefense, and nonproliferation. At the very least, two concentrations – a science/technical and a science/non-technical – should be offered. Having the same course of study for these two diverse groups is not a good idea. I am deeply concerned about the viability of a program without at least these concentrations.

The third area of concern is regarding the decision to stop all admissions until the fall of 2006 -even though initially the decision was made to allow the continued admission of MS students. This inability to make decisions reflects poorly on the program, the College, and the University. Staff in the biodefense graduate program is bombarded daily by frustrated and even angry potential students – some in upper level positions within various government agencies and departments, asking for an explanation of such a hasty and unprofessional decision, but we have nothing to tell them because we have been told nothing.

There has been a complete shutdown in communication between the College, the NCBD administration, and the administration of the graduate programs in biodefense that I find both perplexing and frustrating. I am trying to resist the urge to assume that this lack of communication is indicative of the College’s level of commitment to the program and its 250+ students, but it is difficult find an alternative explanation.

Decisions are being made behind closed doors, leaving the program’s administration and staff increasingly worried. There is great concern over the fact that these decisions are being made without input from either the staff or from the students. Students were attracted to this program for specific reasons, to substantively change the program without their input is irresponsible and will be detrimental to the program. Our students came here to receive an education on how to best protect the country against a bioterrorist attack, which could cost many thousands of lives.

Unfortunately under such circumstances, I can no longer remain as the program’s director. I have chosen to step down as the director of the program effective July 1, 2005. I am deeply committed (and will continue to be) to the students and will continue to teach classes, advise students, and serve on committees but I can not continue as the program’s director and allow students to believe that I have either initiated or support these changes. In addition, I will gladly help the newly appointed director in whatever capacity my expertise is relevant.

I fully understand that as the program grows, changes will need to be made to keep it a thriving, productive, and profitable entity at George Mason University . However, the extreme nature of the changes that have been suggested severely damages the program to the point where I consider it irreparable. It is impossible for me to understand why someone would want to destroy this program when it distinguished George Mason University in this field from any other university in the world. This program is very close to my heart and I have dedicated several years working 12-16 hours a day, seven days a week to ensure the success of the program. I am still committed to its success, but I cannot stand idly by and watch it degrade into mediocrity.

Sincerely, Ken Alibek MD, PhD, ScD
Distinguished Professor of Medical Microbiology and Immunology
cc:
Dr. Peter Sterns
Dr. Vikas Chandhoke
Dr. Charles Bailey

Letter from Ken Alibek resigning his tenured faculty position

3/11/06
Dear Students,
In addition to my official letter of resignation, a copy of this letter I wrote for the students will be sent to President Merten, Provost Stearns, Dean Struppa, Dr. Chandhoke, and Dr. Bailey.

As you recall, last summer there were changes to the Biodefense program that I believe impacted the quality of your education and the security of the nation. As I could not support these changes (removal of courses necessary for in-depth education, loss of legitimate medical and engineering concentrations for students with catalogue rights, loss of concentrations for all students admitted Fall 2005 and later, termination of your educational support staff, and reduction of new admissions), I stepped down as Director but retained my faculty position at your request. Despite my strenuous objections over the last year, I have been unable to convince the administration of the importance of these classes that are so vital to an effective and proper Biodefense education. I know many students also complained to the administration about the changes however their efforts yielded the same null results as mine.

The seriousness of certain events (events of which you are unaware) that occurred after I protested the changes to your academic program last summer prompted me to seek resolution through the department administration, college administration, university administration, grievance committee, and the Board of Visitors but without any visible response. More recently I informed you that there were further changes within the administration that I couldn’t support and that I would begin negotiating the end of my employment with George Mason University . Though I kept the needs of the students foremost in my mind during these negotiations, the administration and I never agreed on terms. For example, I could not agree to the university’s request that I no longer permit students to seek my help as an advisor on Biodefense related matters.

Three long months ago, I filed a grievance concerning the changes to the academic program and the serious events that occurred after I protested those changes and the effects I believed they would have on the students and on national security. A couple of weeks ago, I received a belated reply that the grievance committee was scheduling a meeting for March 22nd however yesterday I received a new email from the grievance committee. The message essentially was that they were postponing the date of the meeting indefinitely and that the students planning to observe the proceedings were not welcome. I find the postponement of the meeting and the interference with students wishing to attend proceedings about their own educational program and futures unacceptable but not surprising.

It is with sadness that I must now inform you that I have decided to relinquish my position as tenured professor at George Mason University . I will continue teaching this semester however will be on vacation throughout the summer and will not be returning for classes in the Fall. My official date of resignation is August 27, 2006. Though I understand my absence will have some affect on the students, the Provost recently assured everyone of the University’s commitment and ability to provide education and dissertation support for all students. When I responded to the Provost about the letter he sent to the students, he said that I “was free to set up a meeting of (my) own, outside of class time, and discuss whatever (I) want to discuss (with the students)”. As your education and your futures are at stake, I would encourage all of you to attend the meeting with the Provost on March 20th to ensure that he is able to provide you with satisfactory answers to at least the following questions:
From what perspective is the program that existed from Fall of 2005 to current the same academic program that previously admitted students agreed to purchase?
In consideration of the numerous courses that have been cancelled, if there were sufficient courses remaining to satisfy student requirements, why are there so many students taking directed studies or directed research type classes?
How can the administration say that students admitted prior to Fall 2005 still have the option of legitimately obtaining a medical or engineering concentration when there is an insufficient number of units available to do so without having to substitute unrelated courses?
How come no new qualified faculty have been hired to teach essential Biodefense courses in the areas of:
Advanced Bacterial and Viral Threat Analysis
Advanced Response Training
Advanced Toxin, Chemical and Radiological Weapons DefenseTraining
Principles of Toxicology and Toxinology
Advanced Crisis and Consequence Management
Anti-crop and Anti-livestock Weapons Defense
Dispersal Patterns of BW Threat Agents in a Field Environment
Working within a Hot Zone
Regulations for Working Within the BSL3/BSL4 Environments
Advanced Epidemiology of a Bioterror Attack
Biodefense Technologies
Prophylaxis and Therapeutic Methods and Approaches to Development
Detection and Diagnostic Methods and Approaches to Development
Disinfection, Disinsection, and Deratization Methods and Approaches to Development
Table Top Exercises and Organization of Drills
Investigational Microbial Forensics
Principles and Methods of Nonproliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons
Export Controls
Open Source and All Source Analysis of Biological Weapons and Related Technologies
Principles of Biological and Chemical Weapon Attack Surveillance
Medical Response to Large Scale Chemical and biological Weapons Attacks
And many others
How will the current faculty who are trained in laboratory based sciences be able to assist students with their non lab-based dissertations in a field outside their expertise
If I am a member of your committee and you will not be graduating this semester, I encourage you to actively seek those individuals who will now assist you through what remains of your education and dissertations. I am sorry that all of my efforts on your behalf over the last year have been unsuccessful and regret to inform you that I have exhausted all options open to me through the university. Though there is nothing left I can do for you, do take notice that you were able to attract the attention of the Provost when you united to defend your education. It has been a pleasure working with you and I wish you every success in the future.
Ken Alibek

Excerpts from student letter prepared for Grievance Committee hearing

Dear Grievance Committee;
This composition will serve two functions: an elaboration of detail that I will present verbally and a written complaint from a Biodefense student. I have excluded names of students to protect their identities however will furnish them to the members of the committee in exchange for a written, actionable, personal guarantee of confidentiality from all members of the committee. Before providing the names of the students, my attorney will draft the appropriate agreement to be signed by all members of the committee.

In order for you to truly appreciate the depth of my conviction as I appear before you today, you must understand the personal cost I will incur as a result… I knowingly yield this award to serve the principles of justice and to give voice to my fellow students long silenced by fear of retaliation from members of the faculty and the administration.

For me, today represents the culmination of a long fight to preserve what was a very unique and necessary educational program. I started fighting for my contractual rights last summer when I spent thirteen hours carefully drafting my “letter of concern” before providing a signed copy to Dr. Alibek and another to a member of the administration I will just call “administrator”…

It is important for you to know what events took place after I submitted the letter… The administrator who received a copy of my letter of concern had a closed door meeting with a member of the faculty (I’ll just call this person “faculty”) in a very thin-walled office adjacent to mine. I could hear their conversation through the wall... I could also hear them discussing how best to approach me.

Faculty came into my office about one hour later (Having overheard the conversation, I had been waiting). Faculty wanted to discuss my work in the laboratory and said that it wasn’t acceptable. Faculty then said that if I wanted to stay in the lab that I would need to stop taking courses and stop working with Dr. Alibek...This manipulative attempt was completely expected after overhearing the conversation.

Students have seen some bewildering occurrences:
Students became suspicious when the education staff that was so vital to the students was eliminated for an unannounced reason.
One of Dr. Alibek’s student’s dissertation was jeopardized when the student didn’t request a human subject research waiver even though he wasn’t doing research on human subjects. Since the situation was so preposterous, suspicion of targeting Dr. Alibek’s students was further aroused
I have been approached on two different occasions with warnings from a student:
First warning was not to get too close to Dr. Alibek as he has really made some people angry and “retribution” was coming
Second warning was that I had really angered some people. I said that I wasn’t worried about a few angry students because they didn’t have the power to hurt me. The individual then indicated to me that it wasn’t the students, that these people had the power to hurt me. I responded that individual was then talking about administrators or faculty but even they lacked sufficient power. The individuals parting comment was for me to be careful.

Excerpts of letter submitted by Ken Alibek to Board of Visitors (regulatory body above the University President) requesting internal investigation of university practices

Dear members of the Board of Visitors;
My name is Dr. Ken Alibek. I am currently a distinguished and tenured professor at George Mason University where I have worked to establish a number of biodefense activities for the benefit of the university and the nation. Specific benefits include a new biodefense graduate program with more than 250 students, millions of dollars in new contracts with the federal government, and development of the Regional Biocontainment Lab concept. Unfortunately I must inform you that I am now considering the terms of my resignation from the university because I have witnessed a highly disturbing lack of scientific, educational, and moral values, values that are integral to the credibility of any university.

I have been diligently working since July 2005 to bring my very serious concerns to the highest levels within the university but they have yet to be officially addressed by the President, Provost, or Dean of the College of Arts and Science. The irregularities I have extensively described previously pose a serious threat to the reputation and credibility of the university and need to be addressed by the Board of Visitors as soon as possible. The most serious threats to the university include…

Esteemed members of the Board, the items listed above are only a few examples of the “irregularities” I have brought to the attention of university officials… I strongly encourage the Board of Visitors to open an internal investigation as soon as possible to prevent George Mason University from enduring the public embarrassment experienced by some other universities recently.

Mason has discord with another leading scientist regarding questionable practices at the University

Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2007 13:39:31 -0400
Subject: NCBID issue
Dear Dr. Alan Merten,

In an email from December 14th, 2006, sent to Dr. Bailey with a copy to you, I have described my concerns about the questionable practices and conduct of experiments at the National Center for Biodefense and Infectious Diseases (NCBID), some of which where ordered by the US government.

I have experienced these problems firsthand and I feel that it is my duty to see that this problem is resolved. It is not my concern that speaking up against this conduct prevented me from receiving a position at NCBID, but the fact that concealment of this information from the clients is fraudulent and unethical. I have not received a response from either you or Dr. Bailey as of yet. Please, let me know what actions were taken or you are planning to take to address these problems, and if the customers were informed of this situation.

Sincerely,
Vladimir Vinnitsky

The original letter written by Vladimir Vinnitsky 14th December, 2006:

Dear Dr. Bailey:

It has been to my great disappointment, to be asked to leave NCBID. Yet it is not the fact itself, but the fashion in which it has been done and the surrounding circumstances, that are the greatest source of my discontent. In this letter I will share my perspective on the true nature of factors which ultimately led to my dismissal. There were three reasons which moved me to do so. First of all, I was referred to you by Dr. Lance Liotta, M.D., Ph.D. and Dr. Emanuel Petricoin, Ph.D., whom I have been honored to have successfully worked with at the NIH and whose opinions I value greatly. Secondly, as a renowned published scientist, with vast experience I simply cannot silently accept false accusation of professional incompetence. Finally, as a professional I feel obligated to bring to your attentions the questionable practices which I have faced while working at NCBID, and which in my honest opinion may ultimately compromise the success of your organization.

September 2006, you have offered me to join NCBID, first as an expert in the field of in vivo studies, then within a year move on to oversee a temporary animal facility Biosafety Level-2 Laboratory, and going forward Regional Biosafety Level-3 Laboratory. I gladly accepted your offer and submitted the necessary paperwork, which I was told would take about three weeks to process. In the mean while, Dr. Popov asked me to assist him with the execution of an already designed experiment, as per lack of in vivo experts on his team. Even though I had previous commitments, I agreed to provide my expertise as a part-time contractor. I carried out my part of project strictly adhering to the protocol.

After 8 days of working at NCBID I was given three days to design a new experiment titled Role of Syndecan1 in B. anthracis (Sterne) infection of DBA/2 mice even though I made it very clear that I had no previous experience in this field. I worked 14-hour days including Saturday and Sunday studying publications on anthrax and pathogenic role of syndecan1 in B. anthracis infection to produce the design of new experiment on time and in accordance with the title of the project. Dr. Popov never discussed or even mentioned my design and instead proposed and approved his own design on investigation focused mainly on toxic effect of heparin. Even though I had limited expertise in this specific area of study, relying on my vast experience with in vivo experiments I pointed out the following flaws of the approved design: 1) since heparin is not a shed syndecan1 the design would not adhere to the title of the project or tell us anything about the role of shed syndecan1 in pathogens is of anthrax infectious; 2) the experiment would produce no new information on heparin’s toxic effect in toxic doses, since it was already thoroughly researched by other scientists in the past; 3) as part of the experiment design mice would be injected with B. anthracis preincubated with heparin and protamine sulfate, however the bacteria would not be tested for viability in vitro, thus the experiment could not produce valid data. 4) a limited number of mice (95) and a large number of groups (15) could not produce statistically significant data. Considering all these flaw of the experiment design I suggested that the experiment would produce no new or useful information and would be a waste of time and funds. Dr. Popov disregarded my comments and approved his own design. As I predicted the experiment failed. I was dismissed 5 days before I was scheduled to present on the findings of this experiment.

Even though I was initially invited to only assist on a single in vivo project and at that time had not even been officially hired as a full time employee, I was assigned 3 other major projects:
1. Design of a commercial project on the investigation of Effectiveness of Olive Leaf Extract /Oleuropein for treatment of B. anthracis infectious.
2. Design of in vivo experiments in accordance with the project Use toll-like receptors as potential targets for specific and broad-spectrum protection against several biological weapons.
3. Development of animal model for gastro-intestinal anthrax infectious.

I was given three days to research and prepare a design for the project on using the Oleuropein for treatment of the B. anthracis infectious. I was working to present the project on time, but did not get a chance to do so as I was dismissed the day before the presentation was due.

Concurrently, I was working on the design of the experiments for the project titled Use toll-like receptors as potential targets for specific and broad-spectrum protection against several biological weapons. I was instructed by Dr. Popov to design the experiment to be biased to produce a conclusion that toll-like receptors are ineffective against anthrax, as the project had already been paid for by the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command and he needed to close it as quickly as possible with minimal expenses. I made it clear to him that I could not accept such instructions and that I would proceed to design the experiment properly. Again I was fired before I had a chance to present my work.

To summarize, I successfully completed my part of the project that I was initially invited to participate in. I agreed to design 4 additional projects, before I had even been officially hired, which were never acknowledged, discussed or reviewed. I was dismissed before I had a chance to present any of the projects that I had been assigned and worked extremely hard on, on very tight deadlines. So, you dismissed me on the grounds of insufficient performance, yet did not even bother to verify Dr. Popov’s accusations to discover that none of my work had ever been reviewed allowing to make any sort of conclusion about my performance. At the same time I’m led to realize that Dr. Popov had alternate motivations in getting rid of me.

I would also like to bring to your attention blatant disregard for animal facility safety SOP which I observed during my work under Dr. Popov’s supervision. One of PI’s direct responsibilities is to provide training to his personnel involved in their projects using animals. Dr. Popov failed to do so completely. Considering the fact that the laboratory deals with experiments on infected animals, lack of SOP safety training puts the staff in real danger. Infected animal necropsy had often been performed outside of a laminar flow hood risking contamination. An incident took place when one of the untrained staff a member was bitten by a B. anthracis (Sterne) infected mouse. Fortunately in this case the mouse was infected with a benign strain. In contrast, when working at NIH, even my 30-year experience of working in animal testing facilities did not exempt me from taking a test on animal safety Emanuel, before I was cleared to work with animals.

In conclusion, I believe that it is obvious that my professional incompetence had nothing to do with my dismissal from NCBID. I hope that this incident will not reflect poorly on my reputation in Dr. Lance Liotta’s and Dr. Petricoin’s eyes. I also hope that my comments will be useful in uncovering and dealing with the problems present at your Laboratory.

Finally, I would like to express my deepest regrets that I did not get the opportunity to apply my knowledge, experience and effort to establish a temporary animal facility Biosafety Level-2 Laboratory and in perspective Regional Biosafety Level-3 Laboratory, which is what I had primarily been hired for. On the completion of my hiring process, I was ready to present to you a plan of implementation for establishing temporary animal facility, including paper work in compliance with Animal care and Use Regulations and Policies, Animal Care and Use Guidelines, Animal Care and Use training, SOPs, and other regulations to establish topnotch facilities.

Sincerely,
Vladimir Vinnitsky, M.D., Ph.D., D.Sc.

Anonymous said...

Dear Reader,
Because I am so disappointed that more people don’t take the time to write pleasant and inspiring articles about people rather than write articles showing the darkness and despair within humanity, I am going to tell you in this very public format about Dr. Ken Alibek, a man who I am very honored and privileged to call mentor and friend. If you want to know the truth about this man, keep reading.

Since I mentioned my lack of appreciation for articles that just show the darkness and despair within humanity, I would first like to briefly address David Willman’s July 1, 2007 article about Dr. Alibek. Since I am quite familiar with most everything Mr. Willman described, it made me absolutely furious to see such a biased article full of “inaccuracies” (to use a more polite term). Though I would dearly love to discredit the author and the newspaper, I won’t. I won’t engage the author and the newspaper simply because Dr. Alibek asked me to join him in forgiving them for printing such a biased story full of “inaccuracies” and I agreed to try. It will be exceedingly difficult for me to forgive them as I lack the incredible strength of character required to forgive such a heinous crime. Dr. Alibek does not suffer from the same insufficiency of character…he has already forgiven them.

My husband and I have had the pleasure of knowing this man for three years and we both know him to be an extraordinary individual possessing many fine qualities not apparent to people distracted by his previous work for the former Soviet Army. In fact, I’m confident I know him rather well and that his humility is going to keep him from enjoying this exposition should he ever learn of its existence. Yet I will take the chance of incurring his displeasure in order to tell you about him, someone who is very special in this world. I will preface the rest of my comments by offering forgiveness at this time to those who respond negatively to this posting and just extend my apologies to them as they haven’t had the opportunity my husband and I have had to know such a fine individual.

Yes, Dr. Alibek was highly skilled at making biological weapons for the former Soviet Union but what does that really mean?
1. People gasp when they hear the words chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons but why do they respond that way? It is because they are conditioned to respond that way to weapons of mass casualty or weapons of mass destruction. My perspective is a little different as I view them less passionately along with all of the other weapons man has created to take the life of an adversary…they are all unfortunate innovations. Though I don’t like them, I understand that they are just natural progressions in the development of more effective weapons for war and it makes no sense to vilify their developers any more than the developers of any other weapon. I don’t see the criticisms of those people who invented tanks, grenades, or machine guns. An easy example would be the M249 Light Machine Gun used by troops in our military as it can fire up to 1000 rounds per minute. I have no idea who invented it probably because a weapon with the potential to kill 1000 adversaries/minute doesn’t make the headlines yet its destructive power is obvious.
2. People don’t understand that the process to manufacture biological weapons is very similar to the process to manufacture biopharmaceuticals (but with some important differences). To manufacture biological weapons requires great expertise in biotechnology that can be applied to a variety of products. Dr. Alibek made major improvements to mass production capabilities in the biotechnology field but instead of focusing on what innovative knowledge he has to offer our biotech industry, people focus just on the one product that was of the greatest interest to the former Soviet government, a government at war, and forget that he also produced sera, antibiotics, vaccines, and interferon. He performed a vast amount of work to improve the health of people during those times and he does an unbelievable amount of work to improve the health and welfare of people now. “Dr. Ken Alibek producing biopharmaceuticals that could save the lives of millions of sick children” isn’t nearly as attractive a headline to the masses as “Selling the Threat of Bioterrorism” so you will never see it published anywhere…yet it is the truth. Regardless, he works twice as hard as men half his age in order to ease the suffering of the world’s people. He is a physician not only by training but also by nature.

Instead of discussing events at George Mason University that have been called into question, I will direct you to the information posted online by Ann Workman and ask you to decide for yourself if there is more to the story than what Mr. Willman published. Though I don’t like the use of the term “fascinating”, the documents provided are genuine though I know the information that had the most potential to damage the reputation of the University was removed before posting. Regardless, I believe the documents demonstrate the extreme integrity and motivations of Dr. Ken Alibek and give the reader some insights into the man himself.

You have very patiently waited for me to tell you about Ken Alibek, the man. “What is he like?” is a very common question asked of me and my husband and I will tell you what I tell everyone. First, Dr. Alibek really isn’t going to like that I do this for you because he is a very humble man but I know that he will forgive me.

In addition to his great capacity for forgiveness, the man truly is brilliant and innovative. One misconception I want to clear up right now is about whether or not ironing letters can kill anthrax (B. anthracis) spores. This thoughtful suggestion to people who were really panicked about the possibility of receiving a contaminated letter was discredited, but later Marc Roberge (a high school senior and son of a prominent CDC scientist) conducted an experiment that supported Dr. Alibek’s statement. Mr. Roberge’s experiment and results were to be published in a peer reviewed journal but I haven’t looked for the publication.

I already mentioned throughout this letter that Dr. Alibek is brilliant, innovative, humble, forgiving, strong, and hardworking. He is also very kind, generous, and thoughtful but as the saying goes - do not mistake his kindness for weakness. He is a consummate professional and a highly skilled businessman with noble intentions. He is absolutely dedicated to helping other people…a genuine philanthropist. Additionally, people who truly know him will tell you that he is a man of high integrity as well as a loyal and trustworthy friend. My husband and I are truly fortunate and proud to have him in our lives.

Dr. Debra Anderson
debra51704atyahoo.com