Between the lines

Xymphora brings to our attention a long, intriguing and frustrating essay, published in Haaretz, on the current and future situation in the Middle East. The author is Efraim Halevy, formerly the head of Mossad and currently the National Security advisor to Ariel Sharon.

Halevy deserves our attention for many reasons -- not least among them being the behind-the-scenes role he played in the life and writings of Victor Ostrovsky, the renegade Mossad agent who left the service, moved to Canada, sidestepped the assassins, and wrote a couple of tell-all books: By Way of Deception and The Other Side of Deception.

(Ostrovsky, whom I admire, is now an artist in Arizona. Fine work. I recognized one image that he cribbed from another artist, but only because I used the same source in one of my own pilfering expeditions. As Jules Feiffer once noted, good swiping is an art in itself.)

The Other Side of Deception describes how Ostrovsky, having found himself on Mossad's bad side and fearful for his life, fell under the protection of a Mossad bigwig referred to only as "Ephraim." This is obviously Efraim Halevy; the physical description is spot on. For reasons which I still don't understand, Halevy rescued and protected Ostrovsky, then engineered the latter's covert post-Mossad approaches to the KGB, the Egyptians, the Jordanians, the British, and god knows who else.

Halevy also appears to have given Ostrovsky the go-ahead to publish his books of revelation, which exposed many an embarrassing fact (the most explosive of which may have been Israel's responsibility for the murder of Robert Maxwell). The purpose? I'm not sure, but Halevy seems to have wanted to shake up his nation's intelligence apparat in order to grease his own way to power.

Halevy is usually classified as a Mossad "liberal," a term that requires some flexibility of definition if it must be stretched to include a key Sharon advisor.

Among the key exposes in Other Side: The Mossad planned to assassinate George Bush the elder in 1991, during a peace conference in Madrid; false evidence would have cast the blame on the Palestinians. The Israelis, it seems, had become disenchanted with the senior Bush after the president cut off loans to force negotiations. The book offers only hazy details as to how and why this operation was cancelled; there is some indication that Halevy's was the cooler head that prevailed.

The 1991 murder-that-almost-was puts our current situation into a fascinating perspective. Note the use of the "false flag" (or "fall goy") scenario, often considerd a Mossad specialty. Note the willingness to apply such a tactic to a truly spectacular target. Note, especially, the latter-day kowtowing of George the younger to Ariel Sharon; one cannot help suspecting that the current president fears meeting the same end that almost overtook his father.

I mention all of this because Halevy's current piece -- which touches on many points -- ends with a discussion of whether the United States will continue to do Israel's bidding in the region. As you scan the following, keep in mind that Halevy is the sort of writer who requires some reading between the lines:

The assumption that the United States will always reject Saudi or Egyptian or Palestinian approaches that are not acceptable to Israel requires proof. If there are developments in the region that adversely affect the situation of the United States to the point where it must repay one of the countries of the Arab world, or if the United States is asked to intervene in Saudi Arabia or in the northern system and feels it must prove that it is not facing off frontally against the Arab world, there are clauses in the road map that will make it possible for Washington to accept a particular Arab position without departing from the road map.

The final and binding judgment about the implementation of the road map by the sides rests exclusively with the "Quartet" - the United States, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations - and Israel agreed to let them have the final word. What is emerging is that Israel and the United States have created the framework for an imposed resolution of the conflict, as it will not be the result of negotiations between the sides but of negotiations between each of them and the United States.

Perhaps we may take this as Halevy's way of warning his readers: The United States will play a major role in this region for the next generation. Right now, they act in our interests, but they may not always do so.

Earlier in the piece, Halevy offers some surprising words about the United States and Saudi Arabia. This is the section Xymphora quoted, and it bears repeating:

Some believe that there is a real danger that extremist religious figures will seize power in Saudi Arabia and establish an "Al-Qaida state" in Riyadh. Others note that the national identification of large numbers of the country's population with the Saudi entity is feeble and that their main attachment is tribal or local-regional. Thus, a revolutionary situation might cause the disintegration of the state and the creation of parallel regimes in various regions of the kingdom.

In a visit to the United States two weeks ago, I was told by several well-informed observers that should one of the more severe scenarios come to pass, the United States will have no choice but to deepen its presence in the Middle East. To that end, it will have to renew the draft, to ensure that there are enough forces to deal with developing situations in countries like Saudi Arabia.

Halevy notes that no-one has counted the number of Shi'ites in Saudi Arabia; they may now constitute a very substantial minority.

This fact offers grounds for interesting speculation. Let us suppose that America attacks Iran (and I'm betting that we will, following a massive staged provocation), and let us further suppose that the Saudi dynasty falls. The Shi'ites of Saudi Arabia, angry over the fate of their brothers in Iran, will not follow the lead of the Shi'ites in Iraq -- that is, they will not cooperate with American invaders.

There is a good possibility that Iraq will not be the last country in the region that will require a lengthy American military presence.

No shit, Effy.

The U.S. campaign in Iraq was perceived as a signal of long-term American commitment to do whatever is required and to stay in the "neighborhood" for as long as needed. It was none other than Martin Indyk, the former U.S. ambassador to Israel, who not long ago raised the idea of establishing an American trusteeship regime in the areas of the Palestinian Authority, if it should turn out that the Palestinians are not ripe for self-rule. That arrangement would require an American operational military presence along Israel's border with the Palestinian territories.

If Israel manages to pass off to the U.S. the job of keeping those pesky natives pacified, we have not even begun to see what terrorism looks like.

Finally, a word from one of our nation's real rulers:

Speaking in a semi-closed forum during a visit to Israel a few months ago, Bill Kristol, one of the most influential "neocons" (neoconservatives) in the United States, noted in this connection that the American presence in Europe after World War II lasted for nearly 60 years. Israelis who are trying to promote a role for NATO in the region, in one form or another, are actually promoting a generation-long American presence.

So there you have it. Saudi instability will force America to keep troops in the region more or less permanently. Halevy is, in effect, asking his countrymen whether that arrangement is necessarily such a good thing for Israel.

American troops in Iraq...Iran...Afghanistan...Saudi Arabia...and even Israel? We will soon have the motive (in the form of an unprecedented strike by "terrorists") for such a commitment, but we haven't the money or the manpower. What then?